Using the informational sufficiency procedure from Forni and Gambetti (2014) along with data from McCracken and Ng (2014), we update the results of Lee (1992) and find that his Vector Autoregression (VAR) is informationally deficient. To correct this problem, we estimate a Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR) and analyze the differences once informational deficiency is corrected with an emphasis on the relationship between real stock returns and inflation. In particular, we examine Modigliani and Cohn’s (1979) inflation illusion hypothesis, Fama’s (1983) proxy hypothesis, and the “anticipated policy hypothesis.”
Politics can interfere with capital markets. We show that political interference is a necessary condition for local bias in the stock market. We extend the framework of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) and find that the inverse relation between market‐to‐book ratios and the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in a state (RATIO) is only prevalent among firms located in areas where politics has substantial influence on local markets. Our results indicate that the impact of politically induced local bias is primarily demand driven and stronger among firms that are less visible.
Prior studies have shown that low beta and low volatility stocks earn higher average returns than high beta and high volatility stocks, contradicting the prediction of the capital asset pricing model and the fundamental relationship between risk and return. In this paper, we demonstrate that this phenomenon is driven by the seasonality of stock returns. We show that the risk-return tradeoff does hold in the nonsummer months, and that switching to a portfolio of low-risk stocks in summer outperforms—both in terms of absolute and in risk-adjusted returns—buy and hold strategies as well as the Sell in May strategy of switching to treasury bills in summer.
The financial press suggests that information is commonly leaked prior to analyst recommendations. We examine the impact that three regulatory actions (Regulation Fair Disclosure, Global Analysts Research Settlement, and the legal case against Galleon Group) have on information leakage prior to analyst recommendations. We find that all three regulatory actions have significantly reduced the leakage of information prior to analyst recommendations, even after controlling for several characteristics that explain the variation in information leakage. Our results are robust when applying an alternative method of measuring information leakage, and when forming various samples of analyst recommendations based on different criteria.
We examine the dynamic relations among market returns, market (MV), and idiosyncratic (IV) around business cycles. Compared to the conventional view, which treats MV and IV separately, we first find that excess return on the market anticipates negative MV and IV, suggesting market return’s role as an economic indicator, with the relation stronger in recessions. Second, IV helps predict positive MV, mainly in early part of recessions, suggesting a dynamic evolution from IV to MV. Third, MV helps predict negative IV, suggesting MV may substitute IV to some extent.
Insider trading may alleviate financing constraints by conveying value-relevant information to the market (the information effect) or may exacerbate financing constraints by impairing market liquidity and distorting insiders’ incentives to disclose value-relevant information (the confidence effect). We examine the significance of these two contrasting effects by investigating the link between insider trading and financing constraints as measured by the investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find that, overall insider trading exacerbates financing constraints; however the information effect dominates the confidence effect for insider purchases. Only trades by executive directors are significantly related to financing constraints.